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Secretary of Defense was focused on
building up Army and Air Force strength
in Western Europe, while naval forces
languished because they were seen as of
lesser utility. Hayward set out to challenge this strategic vision by commissioning and then championing a naval
force-planning study called “Sea Plan
2000.” The essence of this plan was the
assertion that any assault across the
inner-German border would result in a
global war. Naval forces provided strike
capabilities that could be marshaled
anywhere, while protecting the sealanes. The redoubtable head of the Soviet
navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, had
enunciated a strategy of protecting his
ballistic missile submarines in their
northern bastions. Sea Plan 2000 advocated naval-based offensive strikes
against the Kola Peninsula and against
Soviet attack and missile submarines
worldwide.

technologies, with the attendant assumption that fewer forces will be
needed as a consequence. Further, he
questions whether the process of transformation is really advanced by grafting
an “Office of Force Transformation”
(since abolished) onto the Department
of Defense, arguing that the services
were in fact taking full advantage of information technologies for a decade before a “revolution in military affairs”
was decreed.

When President Ronald Reagan took
office in 1981, John Lehman became
secretary of the Navy and aggressively
supported such an offensive maritime
strategy. The U.S. Navy budget increased, and the Soviets worried. Their
self-confidence was dented, as they later
freely admitted. No one could predict
what would occur in an actual war, but
according to Kagan, “Hayward’s realization that the Navy’s greatest weakness was its strategic thinking made
possible a transformation of the Navy’s
capabilities with few new technologies.
As a result, the Navy regained a considerable degree of balance against a waning Soviet threat.”

Finding the Target will make an excellent textbook for those whose operational jobs have not left sufficient time
to keep abreast of the changing strategic
perspective in the services.

Conversely, Kagan cites the efforts of
former secretary of defense Donald
Rumsfeld to “transform” the services as
flawed in both concept and process. He
criticizes the recent focus on information
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On balance, Kagan gives the services
good marks for their stewardship over
the past twenty-five years as the nation’s guardians. The current war in
Iraq, however, worries him, because the
military did not adapt swiftly enough.
He is too good a scholar to make
sweeping assertions about American
martial superiority. Instead, he argues
that the process of adapting in order to
win is the nation’s greatest strength.

F. J. “BING” WEST

Newport, Rhode Island

Goldstein, Lyle J. Preventive Attack and Weapons
of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Analysis.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2006.
268pp. $50

Do nuclear weapons represent a source
of stability in world politics, or does the
acquisition of these weapons create incentives for established nuclear states or
longtime rivals to destroy nascent nuclear weapons programs before they actually coalesce into significant strategic
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forces? The answer to both key questions, according to Lyle Goldstein, is
yes. The acquisition of nuclear weapons
creates the incentive to prevent war, exacerbate existing rivalries, and produce
crises, but over time even asymmetric
nuclear balances tend to moderate enduring rivalries and calm more acute
conflicts.
Goldstein’s primary purpose is to address the contemporary debate between
“proliferation optimists” and “proliferation pessimists.” Proliferation optimists suggest that nuclear weapons will
have a moderating effect on international relations. Because nuclear arsenals provide mechanisms for states to
protect their fundamental security concerns while increasing the potential
costs of war, leaders tend to be moderate when dealing with not only their
own nuclear weapons but their opponents’ arsenals as well. Optimists also
believe that governments everywhere
tend to be good stewards of their nuclear capabilities, generally treating
them as political instruments, not as an
enhancement to their war-fighting capabilities. Proliferation pessimists,
however, argue that a situation of mutual assured destruction (MAD), not
nuclear weapons per se, is what induced
caution between competing capitals
during the Cold War. In the absence of
MAD, they believe, states face mounting pressure to launch preventive war
to destroy nascent nuclear weapons
programs. New nuclear states, according to the pessimists, lack the resources,
technical expertise, and stable governments that are needed to construct survivable nuclear arsenals, especially
those that remain under negative control and in times of extreme stress.
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Goldstein addresses this debate with a
survey of the most significant international confrontations involving nuclear
and nonnuclear states, exploring the
incentives, perceptions, and judgments
of nuclear-armed leaders as they contemplate the prospects and pitfalls of
launching preventive war to disarm
emerging nuclear powers. His comparative case studies span the entire nuclear
age: from the U.S. reaction to the emergence of a Soviet nuclear weapons program, American and Soviet responses to
the Chinese nuclear program, and the
Israeli strike against Iraq’s Osiraq reactor, to both U.S. counterproliferation
wars against Iraq. His case studies reveal
that although the leaders in dominant
states often contemplate preventive war,
a host of issues conspires to prevent them
from launching strikes to destroy emerging nuclear forces and infrastructures.
Goldstein’s finding that preventive
counterproliferation strikes are rare is
offset by several observations that are
not at all reassuring. Counterproliferation attacks have been contemplated
from the start of the nuclear age, but
actual attacks are a relatively recent
phenomenon. Goldstein’s analysis suggests that the revolutions in conventional precision guidance and global
reconnaissance capabilities have tipped
the balance in favor of preventive war,
although risks still remain. U.S. officers
and officials, for instance, were deeply
concerned about the prospect that
Saddam Hussein might retaliate with
chemical or biological weapons when it
became clear that the regime in Baghdad itself was the target of coalition operations in 2003; nevertheless, members
of the administration were ultimately
undeterred by what they considered to
be a credible threat. Goldstein concludes
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with an even more disturbing observation: that world politics might be
entering a period of pronounced instability as the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and associated delivery systems accelerates. More opportunities
will soon present themselves to stop ambitious nascent nuclear states in their
tracks.
Goldstein’s narrative is compelling, theoretically informed, well written, and well
organized. His comparative study sheds
light on the proliferation optimism/
pessimism debate, even though his conclusions are unlikely to satisfy either
camp. Skeptics might point out that his
case studies are a bit cursory and lack
documentary evidence drawn from the
various capitals in question. To its
credit, however, Goldstein’s work is relatively comprehensive and provides a
global perspective on how preventive
war dynamics play out among Western
and non-Western antagonists. It also
provides a chronological perspective on
how the phenomenon of preventive war
might, in fact, be changing. His work
thus constitutes a significant and enduring contribution to the literature on
nuclear proliferation, deterrence, and
preventive war.

JAMES J. WIRTZ

Naval Postgraduate School
Kennedy, Paul. The Parliament of Man: The Past,
Present, and Future of the United Nations. New
York: Random House, 2006. 384pp. $26.95

An institution as central to the contemporary world’s political and geostrategic
landscape as the United Nations is constantly in need of thoughtful, scholarly
attention. Paul Kennedy delivers just
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this with The Parliament of Man. Kennedy, the author of The Rise and Fall of
the Great Powers and Grand Strategies in
War and Peace, approves of the idea of
the UN but is not blind to its failings.
He believes that “since this is the only
world organization that we possess, we
need to make it work in the best way
possible, in order to help humankind
navigate our present turbulent century.” Consequently, while the book is
mostly historical, a consistent tone of
apology runs along with the narrative.
It is a story, Kennedy writes, of “evolution, metamorphosis, and experiment,
of failure and success,” but a story that
is ultimately justified.
A solid introductory chapter traces the
deepest roots of the UN back to post–
Napoleonic Europe, but Kennedy very
naturally spends most of his time examining events in the wake of World War
I. Here Kennedy rehearses the prehistory of the UN from the advent of its
predecessor, the League of Nations,
through that organization’s failures and
the consequent outbreak of World War
II. While this chapter contains little in
the way of new information or startling
revelations, it is well written, succinct,
and peppered with insights.
What follows are several thematic chapters on such topics as the working of
the Security Council, the execution of
peacekeeping missions, the idea of human rights, UN economic policies, and
so on. Here one comes to appreciate the
true breadth of the United Nations.
Kennedy’s examination of the Security
Council is especially timely, given the
growing pressures for its expansion and
restructuring. Kennedy’s account of the
UN’s track record in peacekeeping operations (arguably its highest-profile
role in much of the world) is prefaced
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